Aquinas Day By Day 189 Aquinas’s topic: Logic of concepts: three senses of terms: univocal, equivocal, analogous Psalm: “The Lord is your guard and your shade; at your right side he stands.” Psalm 121 Aquinas’s text: Summa theologiae 1. 13.5 Very often the same term, when applied to two different things, has exactly the same meaning, as “animal” predicated of “dog” and “cat.” This is the univocal sense of terms. Occasionally, the same term means something completely different, as when “bank” is predicated of the river bank and the bank where we have an account. This is the equivocal use of terms. Lying between them, so to speak, is the analogous use of terms, of which Br. Thomas was so fond. Here the same term has a similar but not identical meaning. In this text about God, Aquinas makes use of some Aristotelian examples to explain the terms are used analogously between God and creatures. Aquinas’s question: Is what is said of God and of creatures predicated univocally of them?Part of his response: It is impossible that something be predicated of God and creatures univocally. For every effect not adequate to the power of the efficient cause receives a likeness of the agent not in the same nature but deficiently, so that what is divided and multiplied in effects exists in the cause absolutely and uniformly. For example, the sun in its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as was said, all perfections existing in creatures as divided and multiplied pre-exist in God in unity. Therefore, when a term expressing perfection is said of a creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct according to the meaning of its definition from other perfections; as when the term “wise” is said of a human, we signify some perfection distinct from the human essence and from his power and from his existence and from all things of this sort. But we say this term of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from his essence or power or existence. And so, when the term “wise” is said of a human, in a manner it circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; but not when it is said of God, where it leaves the thing signified as un-comprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name. Consequently, it is clear that this term “wise” is not said according to the same definition of God and human. And same thing applies to other terms. Consequently, no term is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. On the other hand, no term is said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, as some have held. For of this view nothing could be known about God from creatures, or demonstrated about God at all; but everything would fall into the fallacy of equivocation. Now this against the philosophers, who prove many things about God demonstratively, and it is also against what the Apostle, who says “the invisible things of God have been made known through the things that are made” [Rm. 1:20]. Therefore, it should be said that terms of this sort are said of God and creatures by analogy, that is, proportion. Now this is true of terms in two ways: either because many things are proportioned to one, as “healthy” is said of both medicine and urine, since both have some order and proportion to the health that is in an animal, one a sign of health and the other a cause of health; or because one is proportioned to the other, as “healthy” is said of medicine and an animal, since medicine is the cause of the health that exists in the animal. And it is in this way that some things are said of God and creatures analogically, not purely equivocally nor univocally. For we are only able to name God from creatures, as was said. In this way, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to some ordering of creature to God as to its principle and cause in whom there pre-exist in an excellent way all the perfections of things. Now this mode of community is an intermediate between pure equivocity and simple univocity. For in things said analogically there is not one meaning [ratio], as in univocals, but they are not totally diverse, as in equivocals; but a term which is thus said in a manifold sense signifies diverse proportions to something that is one. For example, “healthy,” when said of urine signifies “a sign of health in the animal,” but when said of medicine it signifies “a cause of the same health.” Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur. Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis. [Introductions and translations © R.E. Houser] |